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Abstract: In this paper I critically discuss the normative significance 
of so-called social determinants of health and their use in public health 
policy. I will highlight certain possible and real misperceptions that are 
common in public health research and public health policy. After intro-
ducing the concept of the social determinants of health, the first issue I 
discuss concerns the confusion surrounding the notion of health in pub-
lic health. Public health is mainly concerned with health dispositions or 
risks. This is different from a concern for people being unhealthy in the 
sense of suffering from a disease. The difference is important for the no-
tion of health inequalities as well. In order to deem some people less 
healthy than others, a gradual concept of health is needed. Once the two 
concepts of health are confused, it is more difficult to acknowledge nor-
mative differences between being unhealthy and being less healthy. I 
submit that public health policies tend to exploit the common attitude 
towards diseases, namely that they ought to be treated and that they es-
tablish claims of justice. It is then another step of public health practition-
ers to campaign against social conditions that lead to certain health ine-
qualities, which are deemed unjust. In other words, public health allows 
a normative argument, via the value of health, against specific social 
conditions. I reject this approach and allow only an indirect role for in-
equalities of health dispositions in an account of social justice. They might 
be regarded as symptoms of social ills, but they are not, according to my 
Ramon Llull Journal_09.indd   155 6/6/18   9:40
156 RAMON LLULL JOURNAL OF APPLIED ETHICS 2018. ISSUE 9 PP. 155-165
mind, as such unjust. Injustice in social conditions needs to be established 
in its own right, not mainly via its impact on health dispositions in spe-
cific populations. In the final section I hint towards an alternative, a 
noncomparative theory of social justice, which aims at enabling citizens 
to make healthy choices, but is not per se interested in comparative dif-
ferences between people.
Keywords: public health, social determinants of health, concept of 
health, health inequalities, noncomparative justice
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
The health status of individuals is determined by many factors. They 
might suffer accidents if safety measures are inadequate; they might be 
under threat of falling ill when living or working in a dangerous and un- 
healthy environment, such as slums or coalmines. They might also be 
under risk to develop chronic diseases if not treated adequately by medi-
cal means. Public health measures have therefore, for a long time, focused 
on improving the environment of citizens by getting rid of directly harm-
ful determinants of health and by enhancing access to medical resources, 
such as hospitals and doctors. In the last few decades, new determinants 
of individual health statuses have been recognized. They have led to a 
new focus of public health policies: these are the so-called social determi-
nants of health. They are elements of the circumstances of individuals, 
which have to do with their socio-economic status, the quality of their 
work, their income, but also with internal resources, such as level of 
education, coping disposition or their general life-style. It has been shown, 
in the relevant research in social epidemiology, that health status is dis-
tributed along a socio-economic gradient (Venkatapuram 2017). 
Social determinants of health work indirectly and often cumulatively. 
For instance, a person who is poorly qualified for a job might struggle to 
get or keep a job, so they might be under constant threat to lose their 
source of income. This might slowly build up to have an impact on their 
health. Citizens might also be uninformed about a healthy diet. In addi-
tion, they might struggle, due to challenging circumstances such as being 
a single mum, to prepare nutritious meals for their family. Due to such 
unhealthy diet, children may become overweight, and eventually suffer 
from health-related impairments. Social determinants of health might also 
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be circumstantial elements, such as having access to recreational activities, 
for instance to enjoy a stroll at the park. 
The focus on social determinants of health, as opposed to environ-
mental and medical determinants of health, has sometimes been described 
as the contribution of a new wave of public health efforts, or even as “new 
public health” (Awofeso 2004). The indirect nature of these determinants 
has also occasionally been flagged up by using the expression “causes of 
the causes” health and disease. In this paper, I intend to highlight a couple 
of theoretical and normative problems that come with the above-men-
tioned more recent focal point of public health.
BEING UNHEALTHY IS NOT THE SAME AS BEING LESS 
HEALTHY
When individuals have a disease, they are unhealthy. A disease affects 
what might be called their absolute health status. This is in line with the 
usual medical perspective, where a person either has a disease or is healthy. 
To be sure, even in the medical perspective we can appreciate that there 
are different levels of organismic functioning, and that therefore the exact 
threshold between health and disease is somewhat fluid. Still, there are 
thresholds determined for different levels of biological functioning – these 
can be found in official documents, such as the International Classifica-
tion of Diseases. The concept of health, in this perspective, is a minimal 
one, as it applies whenever a person does not have a disease.
We can also talk about people being unhealthy in a comparative sense 
(Schroeder 2012). It is important to see this we then switch the perspec-
tive to disposition and risks, and use a different concept of health alto-
gether. This second perspective is also the one taken in public health 
(Schramme 2017). People can be healthier than another person, or 
healthier than they themselves were before, if they are less likely to fall 
ill. In this respect, a person who lives in a dangerous environment or in 
a destitute financial situation might be less healthy than someone living 
in safe circumstances or someone who is wealthy.
Being less healthy is not the same as suffering from ill health or being 
unhealthy. Being less healthy is rather a point on a continuum of disposi-
tions to fall ill. If people are in good physical shape, have a strong immune 
system and live in an advantageous environment, then they are on the 
upper end of the grades of health. In contrasting circumstances a person 
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might be at the lower tail, meaning she is less healthy, implying that she 
might be very likely fall ill. However, it is important to appreciate that 
such a person is not (yet) ill because of the poor health disposition. In 
other words, she has not fallen below the threshold of minimal health.
The point I want to make here is not merely important for concep-
tual clarity – it has a normative significance as well. As we will see in 
the following section, the conceptual confusion between being unhealthy 
and being less healthy leads to a related confusion regarding the evalua-
tion of the relevant conditions. Being unhealthy is bad for a person, but 
it is not so clear why being less healthy is also bad (in the same way). I 
will discuss later in a bit more detail that being less healthy might be bad 
in presenting a person with a disadvantage. The latter could be called a 
comparative harm, as it involves being worse off than others. Given that 
undeserved disadvantages are widely considered to raise claims of justice, 
being less healthy might still be normatively significant. Yet there is a 
different kind of harm involved than the absolute harm that comes with 
being unhealthy.
In addition, there is also a methodological issue with the very idea of 
being less healthy. Since it is a comparative notion, it requires a metric. 
A pertinent question here is in what respect a person is less healthy. It 
seems to make perfect sense, for instance, to compare levels of organismic 
functioning in different people. If my lung capacity, say, is better than 
yours, then I am healthier in terms of lung capacity. However, can we 
ever say that a person is healthier than another tout court? Is a profes-
sional sportsperson who has clinical depression more healthy than a 
person confined to the wheelchair who is well integrated in a network of 
friends? This simple example instantly establishes the problem of compar-
ing health statuses of different people (Hausman 2012). It is not simply 
the manifold elements of individual health that make such a comparison 
a difficult aim to achieve, but also the need for making judgements about 
the significance of diseases. 
To be fair, research in public health partly deals with these concerns 
and partly ignores them for good reasons. Public health policies usually 
do not focus on health differences as such, but on those differences that 
are deemed to be of political importance. In addition, research in public 
health usually does not compare individuals anyway, but populations. 
For instance, in epidemiological studies it might be established that people 
with higher academic education live longer, on average, than people with 
a poor educational level. Here, life expectancy is a proxy for general health 
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status within a chosen population, i.e. a certain statistically generalized 
health-related disposition, averaged across a group of individuals. Obvi-
ously, average life expectancy can be meaningfully compared between 
different populations. However, it should be clear that we are then talk-
ing about people being healthier than others only in a derivative sense. 
For normative purposes, this difference should be acknowledged.
FREE-RIDING ON THE NORMATIVE STANCE TOWARDS 
DISEASE
Disease is usually bad for us. It might come along with pain and inca-
pacity. Disease can also be instrumentally bad, that is, bad in terms of its 
consequences, for instance when it prevents us from performing a job or 
from enhancing our skills or knowledge. The latter detrimental conse-
quences of disease might be described as disadvantages, as the harms suf-
fered by disease can be seen here in relation to other possible health sta-
tuses. A person might be worse off than other people, who are less ill or 
more healthy, or the person might be worse off than she could have been, 
had she not fallen ill.
Obviously the normative considerations surrounding health care 
provision are due to both the intrinsically harmful as well as the instru-
mentally disadvantageous aspects of disease. We deem citizens to have a 
justified claim to using health care resources when they are suffering from 
a disease because they should not suffer or be disadvantaged due to no 
fault of their own (Wolff & de-Shalit 2007). This is a very common, 
basic assumption of many theories of social justice, which are obviously 
pertinent to our discussion. To be sure, the common proviso regarding 
individual responsibility, i.e. that disease is not due to their own voluntary 
choice, is an important bone of contention in the contemporary debate. 
Individual responsibility plays a significant role in theories of justice. 
However, in relation to health care justice its role is debatable. I will only 
mention the issue here, as the discussion on responsibility for health 
status could have an impact on the assessment of some public health 
policies. Obviously, health-related disadvantages, such as persistent stress 
in a job, could be due to voluntary choices. Such health-related disadvan-
tages might therefore change their normative status and not ground claims 
of justice after all. Be that as it may, the topic cannot and need not be 
discussed more thoroughly in this paper. 
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More importantly for the purposes of this paper, the step from the 
normative significance of suffering from a disease to being confronted 
with a health-related disadvantage is not straightforward. Most people 
will accept that suffering from a disease can justify a claim of justice – 
normally to get access to health care resources. However, this is not 
obvious for conditions that are not diseases as such, but only lead to an 
impaired health status with a certain increased probability. To be sure, I 
do not want to claim, of course, that preventive measures in medicine 
and public health are unjustified. But the normative significance of treat-
ing a disease is different from preventing a disease, because there are dif-
ferent levels of urgency involved. 
The new public health has expanded the concerns of policies even 
further. Here it is not just direct causes of diseases that are being targeted, 
such as pollution or bacteria, but also the social conditions that might 
influence the health dispositions of populations. In terms of a common 
normative concern it is not at all clear why being under an increased risk 
of falling ill, say due to living in a destitute neighbourhood, should raise 
normative concerns at all. To be sure, it might raise normative concerns 
in its own right, meaning that we might deem it sufficiently bad to live 
in a destitute neighbourhood. But this has nothing to do with the poten-
tial health impact of the circumstances of life. With examples like these I 
believe we can see that some public health policies trade on the normative 
significance of occurrent disease and transfer it to dispositions and risks. 
However, such a step requires argument.
CONDEMNING SOCIAL CONDITIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR 
HEALTH IMPACT 
Because new public health is concerned with social determinants of 
health, and since health is considered to be of significant value for indi-
viduals – perhaps even a human right – these social determinants, such 
as housing, work conditions and access to recreational activities, are turned 
into normatively relevant issues as well. This is not only done by point-
ing out the impact of poor health on the well-being of citizens, but also 
by highlighting the economic burden of disease (Hausman 2015). In 
other words, certain social conditions are flagged up as important concerns 
of justice via their health impact. Depending on one’s political taste, this 
need not be deemed bad, of course. After all, there are serious social 
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problems in many societies. If these social problems are not acknowledged 
as injustices in their own right – perhaps because they are seen as necessary 
consequences of a capitalist economy – there might be a different route to 
condeming them if they are connected to the important value of health.
Norman Daniels seems to support such a strategy in his influential 
book Just Health: “Many who are not at all troubled by significant in-
equalities in income, wealth, or opportunities for a higher quality of life 
are particularly troubled by health inequalities. They believe that a so-
cioeconomic inequality that otherwise seems just becomes unjust if it 
contributes to health inequalities” (Daniels 2005, 81). Yet Daniels does 
not himself support such a straightforward link between “avoidable, un-
necessary and unfair” health differences and injustice (Whitehead 1990; 
cf. Preda & Voigt 2015). 
Again, I do not intend to undermine the reasonableness of challenging 
certain social conditions as social ills, and perhaps even to call them social 
injustices. However, I believe this should be done so in their own right, 
not by taking an indirect route via health. Otherwise there is a danger of 
confusing social and medical problems.
An already observable development is the close connection and oc-
casional identification of socio-economically induced health risks with 
diseases. Perhaps the most obvious examples in this respect are smoking, 
unhealthy diets and lack of exercise. These go along with increased risks 
to develop diseases, and they are at least partly caused by social determi-
nants, such as peer pressure or lack of access to recreational environments. 
Smoking is today regularly seen as an addiction, which it can be of course, 
but need not be. Unhealthy diets and lack of exercise are closely con-
nected to obesity, and sometimes relevant choices are described as based 
on a kind of mental defects, for instance time discounting (Barlow et al 
2016). However, choices that are not directly threatening health, but are 
merely risky in terms of health cannot plausibly be categorized as irra-
tional. Again, this does not mean that we should not try to encourage 
healthy lifestyles and to create healthy environments; only we should not 
assume that unhealthy behaviour is itself pathologically or even morally 
wrong. Confusing health conditions and health risks is not only concep-
tually mistaken but normatively dangerous as well.
It should further be noted that there is yet another reason why it is 
erroneous to believe that certain social conditions can be established to 
be harmful or unjust merely due to their status as determinants of ill 
health: this is because the normative status of health is itself not straight-
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forward. It is true, of course, that if we assume that health is the highest 
good we can achieve in society, then everything that protects this value 
should also be deemed of high normative significance. However, health 
is not such an overriding value. Individually and politically, we balance 
the value of health against other values, such as liberty, pleasure, social 
relationships, avoidance of patronizing citizens and so on. The price might 
be a less optimal health disposition of people, but it might well be a price 
worth paying.
To be sure, it might be objected that this objection is unconvincing as 
differences in health dispositions can be translated into socio-economic 
advantages and disadvantages. For instance, an employer who struggles 
at work due to a noisy home and resulting lack of sleep, might be less 
likely to achieve a promotion than her colleague who lives in a favourable 
environment. We can also safely assume that such disadvantages are un-
wanted and usually not voluntarily caused by affected people themselves. 
In other words, comparatively worse health disposition might constitute 
undeserved disadvantages and hence unjust conditions. Considering again 
the instrumental value of health, understood as an asset in competitive 
scenarios, for example the labour market, levelling the playing field might 
require the enhancement of certain social conditions, which have been 
established as determinants of health.
Again, I believe such a type of argument is based on a confusion (for 
a more detailed analysis, see Schramme 2009). First, it should be noted 
that in the public health perspective we do not refer to individual disad-
vantages, but to statistically determined propensities of certain populations 
to suffer disadvantages. Normally we want to level the playing field, as a 
matter of justice, between individuals in a specific competitive context, 
such as running for a job. We therefore need to have information about 
the required provisions to be fully able to compete and whether each 
competitor has achieved or accessed these conditions. However, this kind 
of information cannot be determined by social epidemiology. Second, an 
increased likelihood to suffer from a disadvantage is simply not the same 
as suffering from a disadvantage. Equality of opportunity is not about 
levelling the odds of winning, but of competing on fair terms.
To be sure, it seems certainly wrong if certain populations have a 
significantly lower life expectancy than others. However, what I want to 
argue is that it is neither the comparatively lower life expectancy that 
should cause normative outrage, nor the length of life as such. Rather, 
we should focus on the social determinants of health in their own right, 
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from the traditional perspective of social justice. Epidemiological findings 
might lead us to identifying a specific direction of the concerns of justice. 
In other terms, health-related differences might be symptoms of social 
ills, but they are not social pathologies as such. This makes social deter-
minants of health inequalities only indirectly relevant for questions of 
social justice (cf. Peter 2001; Sreenivasan 2009).
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
NONCOMPARATIVE JUSTICE
Health care aims at providing for health needs. These needs of citizens 
are constituted by their specific health status. First and foremost, the 
health status of a person is due to their specific level of organismic func-
tioning. It is not based on any comparison with other persons. In terms 
of justice this calls for a perspective of noncomparative justice. Joel Fein-
berg introduced the relevant terminology a couple of decades ago: “In all 
cases, of course, justice consists in giving a person his due, but in some 
cases one’s due is determined independently of that of other people, while 
in other cases, a person’s due is determinable only by reference to his 
relations to other persons. I shall refer to contexts, criteria, and principles 
of the former kind as noncomparative, and those of the latter sort as 
comparative” (Feinberg 1974: 298; emphases in original). 
I have discussed the noncomparative perspective on justice in public 
health more thoroughly in a different paper (Schramme 2015). I believe 
it leads us to a theory of justice, which is called sufficientarianism and 
which mainly contrasts with egalitarianism (Segall 2013). Sufficientarian-
ism in public health aims at providing good enough health for every 
citizen. This includes preventive measures as well, and hence public health 
policies are indeed justified in aiming at certain social determinants of 
health. However, sufficientarianism is not concerned with inequalities 
between people or populations as such. Unequal health statuses might be 
an indicator of noncomparative justice, because occasionally the relative 
position between citizens might result in exclusion from society. But the 
latter aim, avoiding exclusion, puts forward a noncomparative standard. 
The goal of public health can be described as providing the necessary 
means for everyone to be able to make healthy choices, not to actually 
make people equally healthy, or as healthy as possible. It is concerned 
with achieving an aim that can be described as “enabling the playing field”. 
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Admittedly this idea is still fairly abstract. In the end, I believe, it will 
have to be fleshed out by real societies in political processes. It is important 
to see, however, that social determinants of health will have to be con-
sidered in their impact on elements of comparative and noncomparative 
justice. Prior to determining which differences in health risks are unjust, 
it needs to be discussed what justice in general requires. It is an important 
insight of the new public health movement to acknowledge the social 
determinants of health. The debate about their normative significance, 
however, should not be bypassed by simplified ideas regarding the concept 
of health and by inflated beliefs about the value of health.
CONCLUSION
The main aim of this paper was to highlight certain conceptual and 
theoretical confusions in public health, when discussing the social deter-
minants of health. The concept of health used in public health needs to 
be clarified and distinguished from the concept of health used in medicine. 
In addition, common normative assumptions in public health policies 
need to be challenged, as the value of health itself cannot simply been 
taken for granted, especially not its relative value in balance to other 
important social goals. Even if social conditions causally contribute to 
significant inequalities in health dispositions, this might still be justified. 
Such inequalities might be helpful evidence when thinking about justice, 
but the normative perspective has to be widened over and above the focus 
of public health. Hence public health needs to be linked to debates in 
ethics and political philosophy. Public health policy should not set its 
own agenda.
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